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In the  current  corporate  context,  information  on  corporate  risks  plays  an  essential  role  in  the decision-
making  process  and  in an adequate  assessment  of different  organizations.
The current  study  examines  the  main  risks  disclosed  by  the largest  Spanish  companies  and  analyses
the  factors  underlying  this  disclosure,  particularly  those  linked  to  corporate  governance.
The  content  analysis  performed  shows  that  Spanish  companies  reveal  relatively  little  information  on
risks.  Their  disclosure  mainly  focuses  on the  divulgation  of  the  basic  characteristics  of  the  ﬁnancial  risks
involved.
Likewise,  the  results  obtained  emphasize  the complexity  of  the  voluntary  revelation  of  risks.  While
an  extended  management  board  might  improve  the provision  of  more  detailed  information  about  the
risks  required  by  the current  regulation,  it tends  to adopt  a conservative  policy  of reporting  concerning
the  voluntary  disclosure.  Moreover,  we  show  the  relevance  of  transparency  as  a deterrent  for  providing
voluntary  information  by larger  companies,  due  to the  concerns  about  negative  strategic  repercussions.
© 2013  ASEPUC.  Published  by  Elsevier  España,  S.L.U.  All  rights  reserved.
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r  e  s  u  m  e  n
En  el  actual  entorno  empresarial,  la información  corporativa  sobre  riesgos  desempen˜a  un papel  esencial
en  el proceso  de  toma  de  decisiones  y  en  una  adecuada  valoración  de  las  diferentes  organizaciones.
El  presente  estudio  examina  los principales  riesgos  revelados  por  las  mayores  empresas  espan˜olas  y
analiza  los  factores  subyacentes  a esta  revelación,  especialmente  aquellos  vinculados  al  gobierno  corpo-
rativo.
El análisis  de  contenidos  realizado  muestra  que  las empresas  espan˜olas  apenas  informan  sobre  sus
riesgos.  Su  revelación  se  centra  principalmente  en características  básicas  de  riesgos  ﬁnancieros.
Asimismo,  los  resultados  obtenidos  subrayan  la  complejidad  de  la  revelación  voluntaria  de  riesgos.
evelación voluntaria Mientras  que un  consejo  de  mayor  taman˜o  puede  facilitar  la  provisión  de  información  más  detallada
sobre  los riesgos  requeridos  por la  actual  regulación,  este  tiende  a adoptar  una  política  más  conservadora
y  prudente  de  revelación  en  lo que  respecta  a  la divulgación  voluntaria.  Además,  se  evidencia  la  relevancia
de  la  transparencia  como  elemento  disuasivo  a la  hora  de  proporcionar  información  voluntaria  por  parte
de las  grandes  empresas,  como  consecuencia  de  las  preocupaciones  por las repercusiones  estratégicas
negativas.
3  ASE© 201
. IntroductionThe increasing complexity in business strategies, operations and
egulations in the corporate context has fostered certain trends that
mphasize the need for organizations to provide a higher volume of
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information in order to promote transparency, improve the quality
of divulgation and reduce information asymmetries. These changes
have meant that the usefulness of the information provided by the
traditional ﬁnancial statements to their potential users is less and
less valuable, leading to a higher demand of relevant information
and an effort by standard regulators to improve its quality and
timeliness.
The deﬁciencies detected in ﬁnancial statements have been also
underscored by different authors and accounting bodies (AICPA,
ights reserved.
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994; FASB, 2001; ICAEW, 1998, 1999, 2002; Lev & Zarowin, 1999),
uggesting the need to include new informative elements in them
o fulﬁl the purpose of being useful to users in the decision-making
rocess.
Amongst the issues that can be improved in the scope of cor-
orate communication, the disclosure of risks that companies face
n their operations stands out especially. Corporate risks can be
eﬁned as the possibility of a negative future impact on the eco-
omic position of the company (GASC, 2000); in other words, the
oss of wealth expressed in a reduction of future earnings, cash
ows, market share or any other variable that reﬂects a negative
mpact. In the current context, risk management has become an
ssential part of organizations’ internal control and corporate gov-
rnance, and a basic element of the business sphere. Nevertheless,
here exists a lack of transparency in the disclosure of information
n risks, due to the absence of norms and uniform measures (Lajili
 Zeghal, 2005), among other factors.
It is widely believed that improved understanding of business
isks by investors and other users of corporate reporting should lead
o better stewardship of companies and to a more efﬁcient alloca-
ion of resources (ICAEW, 2011). This information can be useful for
nvestors to assess the quantity, duration and certainty of future
ash ﬂows and to determine the companies’ risk proﬁles, market
alue and accuracy in the forecasts on stock prices (Abraham & Cox,
007; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Helliar & Dunne, 2004; Linsley &
hrives, 2001). In this sense, the information on risks can contribute
o manage change (Abraham & Cox, 2007), reduce the cost of cap-
tal (ICAEW, 2011; Linsley & Shrives, 2001, 2006), report on the
uture path of the business model (Cabedo & Tirado, 2004; ICAEW,
999) and allow companies to communicate the message that they
holly understand their own risks and have developed practices to
anage them (Abraham, Solomon, & Stevenson, 2007).
As Cabedo and Tirado (2007, p. 42) underscore, there is some
egree of unanimity as to the need for reporting on corporate risks,
lthough this consensus disappears when discussing whether the
elease should be compulsory or voluntary. Nowadays, except for
he regulation of ﬁnancial risks, most of the disclosure is volun-
ary. Several theories of the ﬁrm support the disclosing of voluntary
nformation. According to the Agency Theory, the release of volun-
ary information is an essential factor in the decision-taking process
nd can work as a control system over managers’ activities on behalf
f shareholders and other stakeholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
n addition, in accordance with the Theory of Political Costs, com-
anies would disclose voluntarily information because it could lead
o reducing political costs (e.g. taxes) and obtaining certain advan-
ages (e.g. subsidies). In the same vein, the Theory of Signals holds
hat the divulgation can be regarded as a signal to capital markets,
o that information asymmetries can be reduced, ﬁnancing costs
re optimized and corporate value increases (Baiman & Verrecchia,
996).
However, the Theory of Proprietary Costs emphasizes the poten-
ial harm that could stem from the use of the information provided,
iven that this information would be public not only for current
nd potential investors, but also for competitors. There are also
ther potential disadvantages that could result from voluntary
isclosures (Gray et al., 1990): threats of takeovers or mergers,
ossibilities of intervention by government agencies and taxa-
ion authorities, and possibilities of claims from employees or
rade unions or from political or consumer groups. The informa-
ion would also be available for other interested users, such as
overnments, trade unions, consumer associations, clients or sup-
liers, thereby leading to likely increases in pressures on the ﬁrm
e.g. demands related to prices or salaries). Therefore, the divulga-
ion of corporate information is the result of a trade-off between
he incentives to disclose and the drawbacks stemming from that
isclosure.lidad – Spanish Accounting Review 17 (2) (2014) 116–129 117
Along this line, Dobler (2007) looks into the issues related to
the credibility of the information as a disincentive to disclosure.
He argues that there are three potential explanations for a more
restricted report on risks: (1) executives may  not report because
they do not have speciﬁc enough information about their risks;
(2) they cannot reveal them credibly; (3) they can withhold infor-
mation owing to the threats of commercial harm. In addition to
the inherent unreliability, the Institute of Chartered Accountants
in England and Wales (ICAEW, 2011) has also stressed that, in
some circumstances, costs may  exceed perceived beneﬁts, leading
to uninformative disclosures.
Concerning previous literature, some studies (ICAEW, 1998,
1999, 2002; Linsley & Shrives, 2005; Schrand & Elliott, 1998;
Solomon, Solomon, Norton, & Joseph, 2000) have shown that com-
panies are providing insufﬁcient information, characterized by a
lack of coherence (Linsley & Lawrence, 2007), brevity and exces-
sive focus on past risk (Abraham & Cox, 2007), and with a main
approach to ﬁnancial risks (typically associated with the use of
ﬁnancial derivatives). However, in addition to the ﬁnancial risk,
organizations have to cope with corporate risks or changes in the
global economic climate that may  affect their values adversely.
Therefore, taking into consideration the widely-accepted per-
ception that companies are not providing sufﬁcient information
on risks and their management, and the call to undertake better
disclosures, the aim of this study is: (1) to analyse the main risks
disclosed by Spanish companies, either compulsory or voluntary;
and (2) to analyse some factors both linked to corporate gover-
nance and evidenced as relevant in previous empirical studies,
which can boost or deter the divulgation of this kind of infor-
mation. In addition to voluntary information, we also assess the
extent of disclosure regarding compulsory information, given that
it is not similar to reveal just simple features in search for strict
compliance of the current regulation or to include a further step
of disclosure by providing abundant data, ranging from vague and
generic disclosure to quantitative estimations and more speciﬁc
data. Although compulsory, this latter choice would imply “a strate-
gic touch”, going deeply into the information provided, with more
content and detail.
We thus proceeded to analyse the disclosure of risks undertaken
by the largest Spanish companies (excluding ﬁnancial and insur-
ance companies), quoted on the Madrid Stock Exchange, during
the period 2007–2009. These companies show a high degree of vis-
ibility in markets and, consequently, they have strong incentives to
report on their risks. Firstly, we performed a content analysis, creat-
ing a disclosure index that compiles both the volume of information
revealed and its quality in relation to a set of risks whose disclosure
is compulsory, mainly ﬁnancial risks (credit, liquidity and market
risks) and other risks whose revelation is voluntary, such as non-
ﬁnancial risks (operational, business, environmental, new invest-
ments, reputation, country risks). We  then studied the inﬂuence of
some factors on this revelation, using panel data methodologies in
order to control for the unobserved heterogeneity.
Previous papers have concluded that the divulgation of volun-
tary information is determined by factors such as: the presence of
independent directors (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Chen & Jaggi, 2000;
Schellenger, Wood, & Tashakori, 1989), Board activity (Banghoj &
Plenborg, 2008), Board stock ownership (Lim, Matolcsy, & Chow,
2007), as well as the corporate size (Amran, Manaf, & Che, 2009;
Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley & Shrives, 2006), leverage
(Ahmed & Courtis, 1999; García-Meca & Sánchez, 2006; Rodríguez
Domínguez, Gallego Álvarez, & García Sánchez, 2008, 2009), pro-
ﬁtability (Chen & Jaggi, 2000; Marston & Polei, 2004) and the
industrial sector (Gallego Álvarez, García Sánchez, & Rodríguez
Domínguez, 2008; Watson, Shrives, & Marston, 2002).
However, these factors have not been analysed in relation to the
corporate information on risks in a context of corporate governance
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ike the one in Spain, characterized by a low proportion of quoted
rms and high ownership concentration in non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms,
nancial institutions and family businesses. Also, the members
f the Board manage and monitor at the same time (Rodríguez
omínguez, Gallego Álvarez, & García Sánchez, 2011).
This study contributes to extending our knowledge about how
panish companies are disclosing their risks, regarding both the
mount and the quality of the risks revealed, and how the infor-
ation is disclosed through quantitative and qualitative measures.
ikewise, this analysis is located within the line of research linked to
he disclosure of corporate information. It thus allows us to contrast
he arguments of the theories of Agency, Signals, Political Costs and
roprietary Costs, at the same time that it obtains some practical
mplications that can be useful to accounting standard setters and
anagers responsible for corporate disclosure.
It is worth emphasizing that this work is one of the ﬁrst
xploratory studies undertaken in Spain, to our best knowledge.
his topic has received greater attention in other countries, such
s the United Kingdom (e.g. Linsley & Lawrence, 2007; Linsley &
hrives, 2000, 2005, 2006; Woods & Reber, 2003), the United States
Linsmeier, Thornton, Venkatachalam, & Welker, 2002; Roulstone,
999), Germany (Kajüter, 2001; Kajüter & Winkler, 2003), Italy
Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004) or Canada (Lajili & Zeghal, 2005). It
lso links two research lines in Spain, such as corporate disclosure
nd corporate governance, which, in other contexts, have provided
any empirical studies such as those mentioned above.
In short, the results emphasize the complexity of the voluntary
evelation of risks. Whereas an extended board may  facilitate the
rovision of more detailed information about the risks required
y the current regulation, it tends to adopt a conservative pol-
cy of reporting concerning the voluntary disclosure. Moreover, we
vidence the relevance of visibility as a deterrent of providing vol-
ntary information for larger companies, as a consequence of the
oncerns about negative strategic repercussions.
The study is structured in six sections. After this introduction,
ection 2 describes the Spanish regulation on the disclosure of cor-
orate risks, as well as previous empirical studies related to the
eporting on risks. Section 3 is devoted to explaining several drivers
hat can inﬂuence corporate disclosure, and proposes the research
ypotheses. Section 4 presents the methodology. The empirical
esults from the statistical description are explained in Section
, while those from the multivariate analysis are shown and dis-
ussed in Sections 6 and 7. We  then conclude with some of the
ost relevant implications derived from the ﬁndings.
. Current situation in the disclosure of risks: Spanish
egulation and previous studies
Firstly, we describe the Spanish regulation that establishes the
ramework for the disclosure of information on corporate risks. We
hen review some of the main studies that have analysed the dis-
losure of risks in an international sphere, emphasizing the most
elevant ﬁndings.
.1. Spanish regulations on the disclosure of risks
The importance of corporate disclosure on risks has increased
ecently due to the current business context, characterized by the
resence of constant changes which lead to higher uncertainty
bout the future evolution of corporations. Likewise, the ﬁnan-
ial scandals have implied that risk disclosures are increasingly
equired by different stakeholders.
Some regulatory bodies have issued norms that regulate the
eporting on risks and thereby oblige managers to cope with that
equirement of information. Despite the duty of revealing theseilidad – Spanish Accounting Review 17 (2) (2014) 116–129
risks, these norms just require the divulgation of ﬁnancial risks,
being discretionary the revelation of other types of risks, such as
strategic, business, and environmental risks. However, these risks
are also important and their knowledge is essential for shareholders
and other stakeholders, helping to obtain higher extent of trust and
to improve the knowledge on the company. Hence, stakeholders
can take more accurate decisions and mitigate uncertainty.
In the Spanish case, the Capital Firms Law establishes the obli-
gation of disclosing information on risks derived from the use of
ﬁnancial instruments in the Management Report, in line with the
international harmonisation based on regulations issued by the
European Union. Along this line, regarding risks, the IFRS # 7 regu-
lates the disclosure of information about risks generated by the use
of ﬁnancial instruments and indicates the types of ﬁnancial risks on
which companies must report: credit, liquidity and market risks,
giving the opportunity of revealing other types of ﬁnancial risks.
In the Spanish context, the Capital Firms Law (article # 262)
globally states that the Management Report must include:
- A description of the main risks and uncertainties faced by the
organization;
- Information about exposures to credit, liquidity and cash-ﬂow
risks in the use of ﬁnancial instruments;
- A description of the objectives, policies and procedures in the
management of ﬁnancial risks used by the company in order to
cope with them.
Additionally, the Spanish regulation does not require reporting
of information on risks other than those linked to the use of ﬁnancial
instruments.
2.2. Main empirical studies about risk disclosure
Several studies have analysed the amount and quality of the cor-
porate risks revealed by companies in their countries. Given that the
disclosure of information is mainly determined by local standards,
the studies tend to focus on their speciﬁc national scope.
The main initial studies emerged in the US context (Linsmeier
et al., 2002; Roulstone, 1999), generally focusing on ﬁnancial risks
and, more particularly, analysing the relationship between risk dis-
closures and interest rates, currency rates and stock prices. They
deal with the risks associated with capital markets, according to
the SEC’s requirements, leaving the door open to the disclosure of
other type of risks on behalf of managers and directors.
In Europe, the context most researched is the United Kingdom
(Linsley & Lawrence, 2007; Linsley & Shrives, 2005, 2006; Woods &
Reber, 2003). In this regard, there is a coincidence in the fact that
ﬁrms tend to reveal ﬁnancial risks more extensively, followed by
strategic risk and integrity risk. Most UK companies provide null
or scarce information on speciﬁc business factors, mainly show-
ing back-forward information and apparently without making any
effort to show how past events have affected a speciﬁc aspect of
risk. In this sense, Linsley and Lawrence (2007) underscore that the
level of readability about risk disclosures is difﬁcult or very difﬁcult,
impeding an effective communication. However, according to the
results obtained by Abraham et al. (2007), those companies which
provide information usually report measurable and quantitative
information, quite speciﬁc in relation to their sector and activities
set, and consequently, useful to investors in order to understand
better the risk proﬁle of companies.
On the European continent, Kajüter (2001), Kajüter and Winkler
(2003) and Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) have investigated the
divulgation of corporate information on risks in Germany and Italy,
respectively. In the German context, Kajüter (2001) and Kajüter and
Winkler (2003) detect a quite reduced revelation of forward infor-
mation on risks, evidencing some managers’ reluctance to provide
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Table  1
Summary of previous studies about risks disclosures.
Study Country Sample Risks
Kajüter and Winkler (2003) Germany 247 ﬁrms Financial and non-ﬁnancial risks.
Analysis of the fulﬁlment of GAS # 5.
Method: Content analysis
Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) Italy 85 ﬁrms Content of the information disclosed (ﬁnancial, strategic
and technological).
Economic impact, type of measure (quantitative,
qualitative)
Method: Content analysis
Lajili and Zeghal (2005) Canada 300 ﬁrms Business, operational, environmental and regulatory risks.
Method: Content analysis
Linsley and Shrives (2006) United Kingdom 79 ﬁrms Financial, operational, competition, technological
and strategic risks.
Method: Content analysis
Abraham and Cox (2007) UnitedKingdom 100 ﬁrms Business, ﬁnancial and internal control risks
Method: Content analysis
Amran et al. (2009) Malaysia 100 ﬁrms Financial, operational, competition, technological
and strategic risks
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vhat information. Likewise, they ﬁnd that most companies do not
dopt a systematic approach to risk disclosures. Similar results can
e found in Italy (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004), where the release is
ocused on past and current risks, rather than future risks, although
hey tend to reveal more strategic aspects, compared to other con-
exts.
Oliviera, Rodrigues, & Craig (2011a) have carried out a review
f previous literature about descriptive studies, concluding that
he risks disclosure is not clear enough, the minimum compul-
ory requirements are not fulﬁlled and the effectiveness of market
iscipline is being affected.
Other studies have examined the Canadian (Lajili and Zeghal,
005) and Malaysian (Amran et al., 2009) contexts. In both studies,
he conclusions are similar: the revelation of risks is almost entirely
ualitative in nature and lacks an appropriate degree of speciﬁcity.
owever, the most frequent revealed risks vary: in Canada, the dis-
losure focuses on ﬁnancial risks, while in Malaysia, strategic risk
s the one most disclosed.
Most studies (e.g. Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Beattie, McInnes,
 Fearnley, 2004; Linsley & Shrives, 2006) show that organizations
re generally reluctant to quantify the effect of speciﬁc issues of
isk in their disclosures. Along this line, given that the revelation of
uantiﬁcations in risk estimations may  lead to directors being more
onitored, directors may  want to avoid provoking judgemental
ttention. This would lead to a higher propensity to describe and
iscuss risks in the annual reports without providing quantiﬁed
stimations of the potential results.
Finally, Table 1 summarizes the main studies, with their analyt-
cal approach.
. Factors behind the disclosure of risk information:
esearch hypotheses
According to Gul and Leung (2004), the policy of corporate
isclosure stems from the Board of Directors. Therefore, cor-
orate governance can inﬂuence voluntary revelation, such as
he divulgation of information about risks. In light of this, we
ocus ﬁrst on the analysis of several features of corporate gover-
ance.
In addition, there are other factors that may  inﬂuence corporate
isclosure, whose impact has been examined in previous literature.
s a result, we have also studied the effect of corporate size, proﬁt-
bility, leverage and industrial sector on the disclosure of a higher
olume of information about risks.Method: Content analysis
3.1. Factors linked to corporate governance
According to previous literature, some features of corporate gov-
ernance can have a signiﬁcant effect on the disclosure of corporate
information; these include size, independence and activity of the
Board of Directors.
3.1.1. Board size
Most Good Governance Codes recommend that the Board should
be made up of a reasonable number of directors, because effective-
ness in the monitoring function may  depend mainly on this factor
(Gandía & Pérez, 2005). However, in spite of increasing the moni-
toring capacity, a high number of directors may be detrimental to
organizational efﬁcacy, given that it can extend the decision-taking
process and the communication procedures (Jensen, 1993).
Consequently, the size that Boards should have in order to be
effective is a widely discussed issue. On the one hand, an increase
in the size, by including directors with new perspectives to ana-
lyse strategic issues, may provide corporate decisions with a higher
quality, among them, those decisions related to corporate dis-
closure. Pearce and Zhara (1992), Dalton, Johnson, and Ellstrand
(1999), Rodríguez Domínguez et al. (2011) ﬁnd that Board size is
positively related to the volume of information disclosed. On the
other hand, other studies (Andres, Azofra, & Lopez, 2005; Eisenberg,
Sundgren, & Wells, 1998) show that the presence of a higher
number of Board members may  imply a lower effectiveness as
regards management monitoring, giving rise to agency problems.
This decrease in Board effectiveness may  lead to a lower tendency to
reveal information about corporate activities owing to the absence
of an adequate control mechanism (Andres et al., 2005; Eisenberg
et al., 1998; Yermack, 1996).
Considering this evidence, we  propose the following hypothe-
sis:
Hypothesis 1. There is a relationship between Board size and the
disclosure of corporate risks, both compulsory and voluntary.
Board size is determined by the number of directors, both inter-
nal and external.
3.1.2. Board independence
Regarding Board independence, Agency theory suggests thatexecutive directors do not have sufﬁcient incentive to dis-
close (including disclosure of risks), because their situation and
behaviour in the company can thus be monitored more thoroughly
(Leftwich, Watts, & Zimmerman, 1981). Also, Fama and Jensen
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1983) hold that a higher proportion of independent (outside)
irectors on the Board may  potentially lead to a more effective
onitoring or control on behalf of the Board, limiting opportunism
n the management and placing the Board in a better position to
eet investors’ preferences concerning transparency and account-
bility (Eng & Mak, 2003). Moreover, Forker (1992) suggests that
he quality of information may  be improved by including inde-
endent directors on the board, which fosters the fulﬁlment of
he compulsory requirements and allows investors to have deeper
nowledge on the board’s work. In this vein, Chen and Jaggi (2000),
im et al. (2007), and Cheng and Courtenay (2006) ﬁnd a signiﬁ-
ant relationship between ﬁnancial disclosure and the proportion
f independent directors.
However, this argument has been discussed in other stud-
es, which suggest that outside directors (both independent and
hareholders’ representatives) may  not be sufﬁciently prepared for
nderstanding the business activities or may  not pay sufﬁcient
ttention to the company owing to their simultaneous presence
n different Boards (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). Also, indepen-
ent directors may  be reluctant to disclose voluntary information
hat may  provoke risks of lawsuits for the ﬁrm (Prado Lorenzo
 GarciaSanchez, 2009; Prado Lorenzo, García Sánchez, & Gallego
lvarez, 2009). Along this line, Forker (1992), Ho and Wong (2001),
aniffa and Cooke (2005), García-Meca and Sánchez (2006) and
braham and Cox (2007) ﬁnd a non-signiﬁcant association between
oluntary revelation and a high percentage of independent direc-
ors.
Based on previous arguments, we posit the following hypothe-
is:
ypothesis 2a. There is a positive relationship between the pro-
ortion of external directors on the Board and the disclosure of
orporate risks, both compulsory and voluntary.
Another relevant issue that may  inﬂuence Board effectiveness
as to do with stock ownership by Board members. The separation
f ownership and control seems to be a signiﬁcant feature in order
o issue voluntary information, given that managers tend to make
heir activities more transparent through the disclosure of infor-
ation not required legally, thereby decreasing potential agency
nd moral hazard problems (García-Meca & Sánchez, 2006).
Several studies (Chau & Gray, 2002; Cooke, 1992; Ho & Wong,
001) argue that the higher the Board stock ownership, the higher
he amount of information disclosed to satisfy users’ needs. In
ontrast, a negative and signiﬁcant relationship is predicted when
nsiders own most of the stock, given that these companies require
isclosure of a lower level of voluntary information. In this vein, Lim
t al. (2007) obtain a negative and signiﬁcant association between
nsiders’ stock ownership and several types of voluntary revela-
ion. Likewise, Oliviera, Rodrigues, & Craig (2011b) do not ﬁnd any
elationship between risks disclosures and ownership structure,
ainly due to the high ownership concentration in the Portuguese
anking sector.
Also, Jensen and Meckling (1976) hold that when executives
wn a signiﬁcant amount of stock, their incentives are more closely
inked to shareholders’ incentives; in other words, when execu-
ives have a signiﬁcant participation in the company, they are
ore prone to exert control of corporate management effectively
Brickley & James, 1987). Nonetheless, the literature that links stock
wnership by Board members and corporate performance suggests
 likely entrenchment in companies with a high stock ownership in
oard members. This fact would not favour the alignment of man-
gers’ and shareholders’ interests and would allow executives to
chieve their purposes against shareholders’ objectives (Rodríguez
omínguez et al., 2009).
Taking into consideration the review of the previous literature,
e posit the following hypothesis:ilidad – Spanish Accounting Review 17 (2) (2014) 116–129
Hypothesis 2b. There is a negative relationship between stock
ownership by Board members and the disclosure of corporate risks,
both compulsory and voluntary.
3.1.3. Board activity
Another feature of corporate governance that may  inﬂuence
risk disclosures is the Board’s activity. Considering the number
of meetings as a measure of Board activity, a direct relationship
is assumed between the meetings scheduled and the degree of
fulﬁlment of Board obligations according to shareholders’ inter-
ests (Conger, Finegold, & Lawler, 1998). More frequent meetings
may  imply that the Board devotes more time to the development
of corporate strategies and management monitoring (Reyes-Recio,
2000). Likewise, Board activity is relevant since it can reduce the
problems of asymmetric information between the different types
of managers and directors.
The Agency Theory supposes that Board activity has a positive
effect on the divulgation of information. Along this line, Banghoj
and Plenborg (2008) observe a positive relationship between
the volume of information disclosed and the number of Board
meetings. In contrast, Prado Lorenzo and GarciaSanchez (2009)
and Rodríguez Domínguez et al. (2011) do not obtain a signiﬁcant
relationship among these factors, ﬁnding a negative association in
the last study.
Following the theoretical arguments of the literature reviewed,
we formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. There is a positive relationship between the num-
ber of Board meetings and the revelation of corporate risks, both
compulsory and voluntary.
3.2. Other variables
Previous literature about corporate disclosure has emphasized
the role played by some factors that may  affect the extent of rev-
elation; amongst them, several features stand out: corporate size,
proﬁtability, leverage and activity sector.
3.2.1. Corporate size
Corporate size is linked to different features that motivate the
release of a higher volume of information, such as the increasing
needs for external funds, transparency, the maintaining of a public
image, etc. For instance, larger companies resort to capital mar-
kets in search of ﬁnancing more frequently, which conditions the
amount and quality of the information to be disclosed. According to
Giner (1995), one of the main reasons behind providing information
externally is the need for good relations with capital suppliers in
order to achieve ﬁnancing in the best conditions. In the same vein,
Leftwich et al. (1981) obtain that the proportion of external capi-
tal tends to be greater for large companies, which are more prone
to disclose in order to meet lenders’ information needs (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976).
Also, the largest companies are more visible in markets and soci-
ety as a whole, with a higher coverage by analysts, and are more
sensitive about their public image. This situation would lead to
an increasing number of potential users, creating in turn a greater
demand for information, and pressure on the company to release
it.
Several studies have found a positive relationship between cor-
porate size and the amount of information about risks: Giner
(1997), Chen and Jaggi (2000), Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), Linsley
and Shrives (2006), Amran et al. (2009), Oliviera et al. (2011b),
among others. In addition, Ahmed and Courtis (1999) and García-
Meca and Sánchez (2006) in their meta-analysis also detect a
positive association between ﬁrm size and the revelation of vol-
untary information.
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To undertake this study we chose market value as a measure of
his factor, assuming that companies with higher market value are
ore prone to disclose information owing to their higher visibil-
ty and greater political costs, compared to those companies with
ower market value.
.2.2. Proﬁtability
The link between proﬁtability and voluntary disclosure is espe-
ially complex. The main disclosure theories tend to indicate that
here is a positive relationship. In accordance with Agency The-
ry, the managers of proﬁtable companies use information to
btain personal advantages, such as ensuring the stability of their
ositions and increasing their levels of compensation. From the per-
pective of the Theory of Signals, proﬁtability can be considered an
ndicator of the quality of the investment. Therefore, if a high level
f proﬁtability is achieved, there will be a greater incentive to dis-
lose information and reduce the risk of being viewed negatively
y markets. According to this theory, proﬁtable companies reveal
nformation in order to stand out from other less successful cor-
orations, obtain funds at the lowest cost and avoid any decrease
n stock prices. In addition, the Theory of Political Costs supports
he disclosure of voluntary information, so as to justify the returns
btained (Giner, 1997).
Many studies in previous literature have found a positive
elationship between performance and amount of disclosure
Ahmed & Courtis, 1999; Chen & Jaggi, 2000; Marston & Polei,
004). In contrast, Giner, Arce, Cervera & Ruiz (2003), Prencipe
2004), Rodríguez Domínguez et al. (2008, 2011), Oliviera et al.
2011b), Watson et al. (2002) and Giner (1997) have obtained a
ikely negative relationship, since higher proﬁtability could spur
ival companies to enter into the company’s market. Consequently,
t is essential to consider the inﬂuence of competitive costs, which
end to increase when proﬁtability increases.
To measure proﬁtability, we have used the Return on Assets, the
atio of operating income to total assets.
.2.3. Leverage
The level of leverage is another factor associated with a higher
mount of information, especially as a result of agency conﬂicts that
ay  arise. In this sense, companies with more debt have greater
gency costs, because there is a possibility of transference of wealth
rom debtholders to stockholders. By increasing the amount of
nformation disclosed, corporations can reduce their agency costs
nd conﬂicts of interest between owners and creditors.
Moreover, as leverage increases, the demand for additional
nformation requested by creditors also rises, because they will
ttempt to ﬁnd out how likely the company is to meet its ﬁnan-
ial obligations. In terms of stockholders, voluntary information
s a mechanism used to monitor management and evaluate the
ompany’s ﬁnancial health, given that the risk of ﬁnancial distress
ncreases with rising leverage.
In contrast, Watson et al. (2002) indicate that, although man-
gers can decrease the monitoring costs by increasing the level of
isclosure of voluntary information, when the debt surpasses a spe-
iﬁc level, the disclosure of information can be adversely affected
wing to the fear of unfavourable forecasts and lenders’ pressure
temming from increasing risks. Along this line, several studies
ave shown negative or non-signiﬁcant results in this relationship
Abraham & Cox, 2007; Amran et al., 2009; Giner, 1997; Petrova,
eorgakopoulos, Sotiropoulos, & Vasileiou, 2012; Watson et al.,
002).Concerning previous studies, García-Meca and Sánchez (2006)
oint out in their meta-analysis that a high level of indebted-
ess leads to more disclosure of voluntary information. Likewise,
odríguez Domínguez et al. (2008, 2011) and Ahmed and Courtislidad – Spanish Accounting Review 17 (2) (2014) 116–129 121
(1999) show that there exists a positive association between lever-
age and the amount of information and risks disclosed.
To measure leverage, we have opted for the ratio of total debt
to total assets.
3.2.4. Industrial sector
Industry has been one of the variables often used to explain
the quantity of information provided by corporations. Companies
that do business in the same industry are believed to adopt simi-
lar guidelines on the information they disclose. They face the same
level of business complexity and industry instability and volatility
(Boesso and Kumar, 2007). If a company fails to adopt the same
disclosure strategy as other corporations in the same industry, the
market could interpret this as bad news (Watts & Zimmerman,
1986, p. 239). Likewise, industry membership may  affect the polit-
ical vulnerability of ﬁrms, and therefore companies in industries
that are more politically vulnerable may  use voluntary disclosure
to minimize political costs, such as regulation, or the break-up of
the entity/industry (Oyelere et al., 2003).
The results obtained in the previous literature are far from
reaching a clear conclusion. While some works have found that
industry membership contributes to explaining the amount of vol-
untary information disclosed (Bonsón & Escobar, 2004; Gul & Leung,
2004; Oyelere et al., 2003), especially in the information technol-
ogy sector or in high growth industries (Xiao, Yang, & Chow, 2004),
other studies have not shown a statistically signiﬁcant relation-
ship (e.g. Craven & Marston, 1999; Giner et al., 2003; Giner, 1997;
Larrán & Giner, 2002). In the speciﬁc case of information about risks,
Amran et al. (2009) ﬁnd that companies from the infrastructure
and technology sectors are more prone to the disclosure of risks.
On the other hand, Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) do not detect that
the amount of disclosure depends on the industry in which the
company does business.
The sectors considered are divided into manufacturing compa-
nies and consumer goods and services.
This set of variables (corporate size, proﬁtability, leverage and
sector), which are regarded as relevant according to previous stud-
ies linked to corporate disclosure, would complement the study of
the variables focused on corporate governance, being included as
control variables in our study.
4. Research methods
Based on the objectives and hypotheses proposed, in this section
we explain the sample and present both the methods used to test
the hypotheses and the estimation model.
4.1. Sample
In order to research the hypotheses, we  select the Spanish com-
panies listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange in the years 2007,
2008 and 2009. Hence, this sample includes the whole set of
ﬁrms, excluding insurance and ﬁnancial ﬁrms, containing 99 year-
observations (six of the original companies were deleted because
of lack of data about corporate governance).
We  opt for this sample given that it is the set containing the
largest Spanish companies and the most important ones on the
Spanish Stock Market. Consequently, these companies have more
incentive to disclose information about risks, because they must
keep stockholders, lenders and potential investors informed as to
their capacities, strengths and weaknesses in relation to their risks,
thereby reﬂecting an image of transparency and market conﬁdence.
The largest corporations are more visible, and therefore the absence
of information is likely to reﬂect a conscious choice.
The data are obtained from the Annual Reports and the Manage-
ment Reports of each company for the years 2007, 2008 and 2009.
1 ontabilidad – Spanish Accounting Review 17 (2) (2014) 116–129
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Table 2
Items of the disclosure index.
Item
Type of risk
2007 2008 2009
Basic characteristics of the risk
Risk management policies
Information about risk coverage
Methodology used to measure the risk22 L. Rodríguez Domínguez, L.C. Noguera Gámez / Revista de C
ata are also extracted from the Madrid Stock Exchange website
nd the Spanish equivalent to US SEC (Comisión Nacional del Mer-
ado de Valores; CNMV). Most of the ﬁnancial data used to develop
he economic variables are obtained from the AMADEUS database.
.2. Elaboration of a disclosure index
When coping with disclosure, one of the most challenging
imitations has to do with measuring the extent of corporate dis-
losure, especially when it refers to voluntary information (Healy
 Palepu, 2001). As Bravo Urquiza, Abad, and Trombetta (2009, p.
54) points out, in most disclosure studies a measure of the lev-
ls of information disclosed is used, under the assumption that
uality or transparency of disclosure is captured. In this line, one
f the basic techniques to study the information provided is the
ontent analysis; more speciﬁcally, the study of the relationship
etween information disclosed and other factors is mainly under-
aken through disclosure indices (Ortiz & Clavel, 2006, p. 90). This
rocedure is widely used among the approaches for analysing cor-
orate disclosure, jointly with subjective analyst ratings, thematic
ontent analysis, readability studies, and linguistic analysis stud-
es (Beattie et al., 2004), and has become generalized in research
Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Botosan, 1997; Bravo Urquiza et al.,
009; Bukh, Nielsen, Gormess, & Mourtisen, 2005; Cabedo & Tirado,
009; Giner, 1997).1
These indices develop a numerical indicator that represents the
uantity of information reported by companies (García-Meca &
artínez, 2004). This indicator would be a quantitative summary
f a set of items that reﬂect how many pieces of information (items)
re disclosed on the reports analysed. The items may be designed as
ummy  variables (value 1: disclosure; value 0: non disclosure) or
ay  be valued according to the nature of the information assigning
 higher value to quantitative information (Botosan, 1997; Bravo
rquiza et al., 2009). Hence, these indices are particularly useful
or categorizing text items and when a large amount of qualitative
ata needs to be analysed, especially when the information is more
ualitative and narrative, such as in the divulgation of risks. Another
mportant advantage derived from these indices is the potential
se of statistical techniques to analyse the factors inﬂuencing the
isclosure (García-Meca & Martínez, 2004).
As the ﬁrst step in this research, we create a disclosure index,
hich, as exposed above, is one of the main ways of evaluating the
nformative transparency of the ﬁrms in a sector or country (Bonsón
 Escobar, 2004; García-Meca & Martínez, 2004). Previous studies
bout risks disclosures adopt a similar approach (see Table 1).
The types of risks analysed are compulsory risks and voluntary
isks. For the analysis of compulsory risks, we take those that are
ompulsory to disclose according to Spanish regulations: credit,
iquidity and market risks. Although their disclosure is obligatory,
e have included them in the analysis, given that companies may
ust mention them to comply with regulation or may  extend the
evelation and disclose additional information with strategic pur-
oses. Concerning the voluntary risks, we mainly follow the classi-
cation set up in (Cabedo & Tirado, 2004, 2009), by considering:
 operational risks, those stemming from error or failings in estab-
lished procedures;
 business risks: the ones taken on in order to create competitive
advantages and added value for shareholders; it refers to the pos-
sible impact that the loss of these company competitive skills
might have, with the consequent inﬂuence on the possible future
loss of company wealth;
1 A broad review of studies that employ indices to measure coverage of disclosure
an  be found in Bravo Urquiza et al. (2009).Quantiﬁcation of the risk during the economic year
Information about future risks
- environmental risks, derived from the relationship between
companies’ activities and the environment, which can lead to
potential lawsuits for ﬁrms;
-  reputation risks, those stemming from the impact of companies’
activities on their public image;
- country risks, derived from the possibility of adverse and unpre-
dictable changes in the current policies and regulations, which
may negatively affect the economic or business conditions in the
markets in which the company operates (e.g. possible introduc-
tion of excessive taxes, the possibilities of public expropriations
or nationalizations of assets, etc.)
In the calculation of the disclosure index, we design the items
that will form the bases for the weighting of the information of
risks revealed by companies (see Table 2). For each of the risks
mentioned above, its disclosure content is measured through ﬁve
items: basic characteristics of the risk; Risk management policies;
Information about risk coverage; Methodology used to measure the
risk; Quantiﬁcation of the risk during the economic year; Informa-
tion about future risks. The ﬁnal purpose is to observe how Spanish
companies reveal their risks, that is, to measure the amount and
quality of the information provided in their Annual Reports.
The information about risks (compulsory and voluntary) is
obtained from the Annual Reports and Management Reports for
each company and each year. We  revise the obligatory and volun-
tary risks in order to determine: (1) the potential factors inﬂuencing
risks disclosures, with a special focus on factors linked to corporate
governance; (2) the most revealed aspects in each type of risk; (3)
whether Spanish companies just disclose the compulsory informa-
tion in accordance with current legislation or they reveal other risks
voluntarily, in line with a strategic use of the corporate reporting.
We  shall now explain the content of each item, by showing an
example taken directly from the companies examined. Firstly, item
1 addresses the basic and essential characteristics of the risk. This
example is taken from the Annual Consolidated Report of Repsol,
2009, page 77: “The credit risk is deﬁned as the possibility of failing
to comply with its contractual obligations by a third party, leading to
losses for the company. The credit risk is measured and controlled by
client or individual. The company has their own systems for the con-
tinuous credit evaluation of all their debtors and the implementation
of risk limits, aligned with the best practices”.
As for item 2 (disclosure of policies concerning risk manage-
ment), an example can be taken from the Annual Report of Sacyr,
2008, page 269: “To manage the liquidity risk resulting from the neg-
ative working capital, the company has implemented renegotiations
of its credit policies and debts with a short-term expiry with sufﬁcient
anticipation. However, owing to the difﬁculties in obtaining liquid-
ity by ﬁnancial institutions, this renegotiation is slower than in other
events, although the expiry dates with the most solvent institutions are
being renewed normally” (my  translation).
Item 3 has to do with the way  in which companies cover their
risks. An example can be seen in the Annual Consolidated Report
of Acerinox, 2008, page 26: “To address the risk linked to commodity
volatility, this company puts into practice a coverage of 85 per cent
of the group’s sales (all sales in Europe, America and South Africa)
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hrough the application of an extra of alloy that allows transfer of the
ickel ﬂuctuations in the London Metal Exchange to the client in the
eriod during the period in which the order is being produced. Due to
his coverage, a 10 per cent reduction in of the value of the nickel on
he London Metal Exchange involves a reduction in the gross margin
f 1 per cent” (my  translation).
For item 4, related to the disclosure of the methodology imple-
ented to measure the risks, we extract this paragraph from
he Annual Consolidated Report (Management Report) of Acciona,
008, p. 72, as an example: “With the purpose of analysing the effect
f a potential variation of interest rates in the Group accounts, we have
erformed a simulation assuming an increase and a decrease in interest
ates of 50 basic points at December 31, 2009 and 2008. This sensitivity
nalysis regarding up and down variations of 0.5% in the Euribor levels
eads to an increase or a decrease in the ﬁnancial expenses by interest
ayment of 29,998 and 77,410 thousands D in the Income Statement in
009 and 2008, respectively. When performing this analysis at Decem-
er 31, 2008, the ﬁgures derived from integrating Endesa Group were
ot taking into account, given that this latter sensitivity analysis was
erformed through the Value-at-Risk method” (my  translation).
Item 5, referring to the disclosure of risks in a quantitative
orm, can be explained through this example (Annual Consolidated
eport, Telefónica, 2009, page 55): “Owing to the direct exposure of
ts dependent companies, Telefonica analyses exposure to the currency
isk at group level. Let us take an example to analyse the sensitivity of
osses or earnings stemming from currency rates to the changes in these
ates. If the currencies from South America reduce their values by 10
er cent with respect to US dollar and the EU euro, Telefonica estimates
hat the impact on the Income Statement in 2010 would be 46 million
uro. However, Telefonica carries out dynamic monitoring to reduce
his potential impact” (my  translation).
Item 6 – the disclosure of information about future risks – can
e observed in the Annual Consolidated Report of Endesa, 2008,
age 93: “Endesa’s potential liability for accidental pollution or other
amages to third parties has been insured up to 150 million euro. Also,
ndesa has insured its potential environmental liability for up to 100
illion euro, deriving from the situations considered in Act 26/2007. If
ndesa were sued for damage to the environment or any other type of
amage in relation to its operations (except for nuclear facilities), and
mounts that surpass its insurance coverage are claimed its activity,
nancial situation and net income could be adversely affected”.
To complete the calculation of the disclosure index, the fol-
owing step is to weigh each item for each type of risk and for
ach company in the sample. The necessary information is taken
rom the Annual Consolidated Reports and the Management
eports in the years 2007, 2008 and 2009. Given that the interest
f this study is not focused solely on analysing whether a speciﬁc
iece of information is revealed or not, but rather aims to study
he degree of disclosure and its quality, we use a score from 0 to 3.
 A score of 0 (zero) indicates that the company does not report on
the item concerning the type of risk evaluated.
 A score of 1 indicates that risks are revealed in a generic and vague
way, without including additional details.
 A score of 2 indicates that more speciﬁc data are provided in the
disclosure of the item as regards the type of risk assessed.
 A score of 3 indicates that the company supplies quantitative
estimations and a high degree of detailed information.
In an initial stage, the coding process is undertaken by two
esearchers in order to ensure the highest objectivity and consis-
ency when scoring the reports’ content.As we have shown above, the risks analysed in an individualized
ay are: (a) compulsory risks: credit, liquidity and market risks; (b)
oluntary risks: operational, business, environmental, reputation,
nd country risks.lidad – Spanish Accounting Review 17 (2) (2014) 116–129 123
To conclude the measure of the disclosure index for compul-
sory risks, we sum the scores of each item for each company, by
type of risk; then we  sum the scores of the different types of risk to
achieve CRDI (Compulsory Risks Disclosure Index). Similar proce-
dure is applied to obtain VRDI (Voluntary Risks Disclosure Index),
by adding the scores of each item for the companies analysed to
obtain a score for each type of risk studied, in an initial stage, and
summing the scores from different types of risks, in a further step.
4.3. Model
Once the disclosure index is determined, we proceed to test the
different hypotheses proposed. In this regard, we analyse the inﬂu-
ence of certain factors linked to corporate governance, and, more
speciﬁcally, to the functioning of the Board of Directors, that may
impact risk disclosures. Also, we  control for the effect of a set of
variables, whose impact on corporate disclosure is evidenced by
previous studies (corporate size, proﬁtability, leverage, industry).
With this goal in mind we  propose model (1), in which the
amount and quality of the information related to the disclosure
of risks would be a function of corporate governance (CG) factors
and some control variables.
Risk disclosure = f (corporate governance,  control variables)  (1)
In order to estimate the model (1) empirically, we obtain the
following models:
Model (2):
CRDIi = ˇ0 + ˇ1BSIZEi + ˇ2%EXTi + ˇ3BSTOWNi + ˇ4MEETi
+ ˇ5CSIZEi + ˇ6ROAi + ˇ7LEVi + ˇ8SECi +
∑
t + ε
Model (3):
VRDIi = ˇ0 + ˇ1BSIZEi + ˇ2%EXTi + ˇ3BSTOWNi + ˇ4MEETi
+ ˇ5CSIZEi + ˇ6ROAi + ˇ7LEVi + ˇ8SECi +
∑
t + ε
- CRDIi is the index of compulsory risks disclosed,
- VRDIi refers to the index of voluntary risks revealed,
CG variables
- BSIZEi is the Board size, measured by the number of directors,
- %EXT is the proportion of external directors on the board,
- BSTOWNi is the stock ownership possessed by the Board mem-
bers,
- MEETi is the number of meetings of the Board in a year,
Control Variables
- CSIZEi is the corporate size, measured by the market value,
- ROAi is the company’s proﬁtability, measured by the ratio of oper-
ating income to total assets,
- LEVi is the ratio of total debt to total assets,
- SECi is the company’s sector, taking the value 1 for the manufac-
turing companies and value 2 for consumer goods and services.
- t are the temporal dummies, included to control for temporal
effects in 2007, 2008 and 2009.
Models 2 and 3 are estimated through panel data methodolo-
gies. These techniques allow us to control for the ﬁrm effect, whose
inﬂuence on this panel may  be relevant, thereby providing more
consistent ﬁndings. Therefore, the unobserved heterogeneity in our
sample is controlled for. Moreover, the dependent variables can just
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Table 3
Frequency of the items and percentage of companies revealing the items for Financial (Compulsory) Risks. Time period 2007–2009.
Degree of disclosure // Not revealed Vague and generic
disclosure
More speciﬁc data Quantitative estimations
and a higher degree
of information
Item Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % Frequency %
Basic characteristics of the risk 7 2% 166 53% 135 43% 8 2%
Risk  management policies 19 6% 92 29% 157 50% 48 15%
Information about risk coverage 29 9% 71 22% 102 32% 114 36%
Methodology used to measure the risk 74 23% 57 18% 103 33% 82 26%
Quantiﬁcation of the risk during the economic year 68 22% 46 15% 110 35% 92 29%
Information about future risks 186 59% 121 38% 7 2% 2 1%
Table 4
Frequency of the items and percentage of companies revealing the items regarding Voluntary Risks. Time period 2007–2009.
Degree of disclosure // Not revealed Vague and generic
disclosure
More speciﬁc data Quantitative estimations
and a higher degree
of information
Item Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % Frequency %
Basic characteristics of the risk 168 53% 99 31% 49 16% 0 0
Risk  management policies 169 53% 111 35% 36 11% 3 1%
Information about risk coverage 237 74% 70 22% 9 3% 3 1%
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Quantiﬁcation of the risk during the economic year 305 97% 
Information about future risks 271 86% 
ake a speciﬁc interval of values (e.g. CRDI scores can range from 0
o 54; that is, 3 types of risks × 6 items × 3 maximum score). Given
hat they are censored, we use tobit regressions. The tobit model is
ppropriate for estimating linear relationships between variables
hen there is either left- or right-censoring in the dependent vari-
ble. In our model, cases are top-coded and low-coded, because of
he scores that disclosure indices can provide. Combining both fea-
ures, we proceed to estimate the model through a tobit regression
or panel data.
. Empirical results
.1. Disclosure indices: compulsory risks
Table 3 exhibits the frequencies in risk disclosures and their
ercentages as regards the items used for calculating the Com-
ulsory Risks Disclosure Index. The ﬁgures reﬂect the content
nalysis performed over the sample referred to years 2007, 2008
nd 2009, globally considered.2 The analysis shows that the issues
ost revealed are the basic characteristics of ﬁnancial risks (just 2
er cent of the companies analysed do not disclose any item about
his category). Also, half of companies report their policy of ﬁnan-
ial risks management providing speciﬁc data whereas 29 per cent
nclude just generic disclosure. The information about risk cover-
ge, methodological issues and quantiﬁcations is more disperse; for
nstance, concerning methodological aspects to measure the risk,
8 per cent of the sample companies reveal vague explanations, 23
er cent do not disclose any kind of information about this issue,
6 per cent provide a high level of disclosure including quantitative
stimations and 33 per cent offer an adequate extent of revela-
ion through speciﬁc data. However, the least revealed aspects are
inked to information about future risks: 59 per cent of the compa-
ies do not mention them, 38 per cent make a vague and generic
isclosure and just 1 per cent provide additional information.
2 It is worth stressing that all the analyses shown are performed over the time
eriod of 3 years (2007, 2008 and 2009). The measurement on a yearly basis does
ot  offer additional information and was not included by space reasons.18 6% 5 2% 0 0
5 2% 3 1% 3 1%
45 14% 0 0 0 0
As can be observed, most companies divulge information
regarding basic features, and policies and procedures of risks man-
agement, with some degree of speciﬁcity. However, as we  go more
deeply into speciﬁc and quantitative issues of risk (information
about risk coverage, methodologies for measuring risks, risks quan-
tiﬁcations), organizations show more disperse behaviour.
In summary, most of the companies reveal their compulsory
risks in a generic way or, in a lesser degree, providing more speciﬁc
data. Furthermore, many ﬁrms disclose their ﬁnancial risks mini-
mally. These results stress that Spanish companies just reveal those
aspects that are strictly compulsory, without providing extensive
information.
5.2. Disclosure indices: voluntary risks
Table 4 contains the frequencies of disclosing each item in volun-
tary risks, such as operational, business, environmental, reputation,
country risks. These frequencies are obtained from the content
analysis applied to the sample containing the years 2007, 2008 and
2009. Most of the largest Spanish quoted companies reveal very
little about aspects related to these risks. The issues most revealed
have to do with the basic features of the risk and policy of risk man-
agement, for which 47 per cent of the companies analysed disclose
information, but mostly in a qualitative and generic way. Moreover,
the least disclosed items are the quantiﬁcation of risks during the
current ﬁscal year (97 per cent of the companies do not reveal it)
and the methods used to measure risks (93 per cent).
Therefore, most companies do not report information on vol-
untary risks and those that provide it do so in a very generic way.
Based on the arguments held by the Theory of the Political Costs,
among others, it is likely that Spanish companies scarcely reveal
their voluntary risks due to strategic reasons, so that they pre-
fer to be more prudent and conservative when disclosing their
risks.
6. Multivariate analysisTable 5 shows the main descriptive statistics. From the results
obtained for the years 2007, 2008 and 2009, jointly considered,
it can be observed that the scores obtained for compulsory risks
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Table  5
Descriptive Statistics.
Variable Mean Min. Max. Std. Deviation
CRDI 8.811 0.00 16.00 4.238
VRDI 1.829 0.00 22.00 3.937
BSIZE 10.599 3 21 3.767
%EXT 0.802 0.4 0.952 0.144
MEET  9.733 0.00 27 3.687
BSTOWN (%) 29.296 0.00 99.33 27.714
CSIZE 5.0462e9 2,748,600.00 2.78e11 2.30258e10
ROA  −0.240 −83.94 3.38 4.759
LEV 1.224 −0.01 197.94 11.175
CRDI is the index of compulsory risks disclosed; VRDI refers to the index of voluntary risks revealed; BSIZE is the Board size, measured by the number of directors; %EXT is
the  proportion of external directors on the board; BSTOWN is the stock ownership possessed by the Board members; MEET is the number of meetings of the Board in a year,
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ime period 2007–2009.
n Spanish companies reaches the mean value of 9 points (with a
aximum of 16 points); therefore, these companies disclose the
nformation required without providing more speciﬁc data or a
igher extent of information. As for the disclosure index in vol-
ntary risks, there exists scarce revelation concerning these risks,
xhibiting a mean score of 2 points, with a maximum score of 22
oints. Additionally, the Boards have 11 members on average, with
 meetings per year. Also, the proportion of external directors on
oard reaches the 80 per cent.
The correlations among the variables are displayed in Table 6
Compulsory Risks) and Table 7 (Voluntary Risks). The variable
Board size’ shows the highest correlation with the dependent
ariable ‘Compulsory Risks Disclosure Index’ (0.175), followed by
Board stock ownership’ (0.119) and ‘Leverage’ (−0.114). However,
able 6
ivariate correlation matrix. Dependent variable: Compulsory Risks Disclosure Index.
Variables CRDI BSIZE %EXT MEET 
CRDI 1.000
BSIZE 0.175** 1.000
%EXT 0.059 0.249** 1.000
MEET 0.004 0.169** −0.554** 1.000
BSTOWN 0.119* −0.134* −0.076 −0.051 
CSIZE 0.015 0.192** 0.076 0.155**
ROA  0.072 −0.004 −0.175** −0.037 
LEV  −0.114* −0.032 −0.016 −0.037 
SECTOR −0.071 0.076 −0.053 0.031 
RDI is the index of compulsory risks disclosed; BSIZE is the Board size, measured by th
STOWN is the stock ownership possessed by the Board members; MEET is the number
orporate size, measured by the market value; ROA is the company’s proﬁtability, measu
otal  assets; SECT is the company’s sector.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
able 7
ivariate correlation matrix. Dependent variable: Voluntary Risks Disclosure Index.
Variables VRDI BSIZE %EXT MEET 
VRDI 1.000
BSIZE 0.089 1.000
%EXT −0.142* 0.249** 1.000
MEET 0.079 0.169** 0.118* 1.000
BSTOWN −0.109 −0.134* −0.100 −0.051 
CSIZE 0.144* 0.192** −0.113* 0.155**
ROA  0.022 −0.004 −0.007 −0.037 
LEV  −0.024 −0.032 0.032 −0.037 
SECTOR 0.089 −0.099 0.076 0.031 
RDI refers to the index of voluntary risks revealed; BSIZE is the Board size, measured by 
STOWN is the stock ownership possessed by the Board members; MEET is the number
orporate size, measured by the market value; ROA is the company’s proﬁtability, measu
otal  assets; SECT is the company’s sector.
* Signiﬁcant at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.ue; ROA is the company’s proﬁtability, measured by the ratio of operating income
their values are not high and we have not detected either high
correlation or multicollinearity problems.
Concerning the correlations shown in Table 7, the variable ‘Cor-
porate size’ exhibits the highest correlation with the dependent
variable ‘Voluntary Risks Disclosure Index’ (0.144), followed by
‘Proportion of external directors’ (−0.142) and ‘Board stock owner-
ship’ (−0.109). Again, their values are not high.
After estimating the models proposed through a panel data
methodology, we obtain the results presented in Table 8. Similar
ﬁndings are obtained in both models, except for the variable Board
size. In the model explaining the compulsory risks disclosure
index, there is a signiﬁcant variable out of the eight proposed,
Board size, with a positive effect on the index (signiﬁcant at 5 per
cent). In the model explaining the voluntary risks disclosure index,
BSTOWN CSIZE ROA LEV SECT
1.000
−0.149** 1.000
0.021 0.012 1.000
0.069 −0.010 0.004 1.000
0.080 0.106 −0.115 0.026 1.000
e number of directors; %EXT is the proportion of external directors on the board;
 of meetings of the Board in a year, as a proxy for the Board activity; CSIZE is the
red by the ratio of operating income to total assets; LEV is the ratio of total debt to
BSTOWN CSIZE ROA LEV SECT
1.000
−0.149** 1.000
0.021 0.012 1.000
0.069 −0.010 0.004 1.000
0.080 0.106 −0.115 −0.026 1.000
the number of directors; %EXT is the proportion of external directors on the board;
 of meetings of the Board in a year, as a proxy for the Board activity; CSIZE is the
red by the ratio of operating income to total assets; LEV is the ratio of total debt to
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Table 8
Results from regressions (models 2 and 3).
Dependent variables Compulsory risks Voluntary risks
Disclosure index
(CRDI)
Disclosure index
(VRDI)
Independent variables Coef. Z test Coef. Z test
Constant 7.546 3.80 −4.893 −1.33
BSIZE  0.198** 2.42 −0.5760*** −3.00
%EXT  1.058 0.52 6.018 1.45
BSTOWN 0.003 0.24 −0.040 −1.60
MEET  −0.0748 −1.47 −0.006 −0.07
CSIZE  5.15e−12 0.64 −2.33e−11** −2.28
ROA  −1.860 −1.04 −1.385 −0.37
LEV  −0.058 −0.94 −0.039 −0.50
SEC  −0.192 −0.79 0.3059 0.55
Dummy 2007 −0.998 −3.52 −2.660 −4.39
Dummy 2008 0.028 0.11 −0.148 −0.28
Sigma  u 3.737 12.102
Sigma  e 1.803 12.51 2.346 8.56
Rho  0.811 18.77 0.964 10.93
CRDI is the index of compulsory risks disclosed; VRDI refers to the index of voluntary risks revealed; BSIZE is the Board size, measured by the number of directors; %EXT is
the  proportion of external directors on the board; BSTOWN is the stock ownership possessed by the Board members; MEET is the number of meetings of the Board in a year,
as  a proxy for the Board activity; CSIZE is the corporate size, measured by the market value; ROA is the company’s proﬁtability, measured by the ratio of operating income
to  total assets; LEV is the ratio of total debt to total assets; SECTOR is the company’s sector.
Model 3 : CRDIi = ˇ0 + ˇ1BSIZEi + ˇ2 % EXTi + ˇ3BSTOWNi + ˇ4MEETi + ˇ5CSIZEi + ˇ6ROAi + ˇ7LEVi + ˇ8SECi +
∑
t + ε.
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podel 4 : VRDIi = ˇ0 + ˇ1BSIZEi + ˇ2 % EXTi + ˇ3BSTOWNi + ˇ4MEETi + ˇ5CSIZEi + ˇ6RO
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
wo variables turn out to be signiﬁcant: Board size (signiﬁcant
t 1 per cent) and Corporate size (signiﬁcant at 5 per cent), with
egative impact on the disclosure. The remaining variables are not
igniﬁcant from a statistical perspective.
The results indicated in Table 8 allow us to accept the hypothe-
is 1 tested (with positive effect for compulsory risks and negative
mpact for voluntary risks), at the same time we evidence a nega-
ive inﬂuence of corporate size on the disclosure about voluntary
isks. Our ﬁndings do not conﬁrm the remaining hypotheses.
. Discussion of ﬁndings
Regarding the discussion of our ﬁndings, our results from the
rst model conﬁrm that Board size positively inﬂuences the reve-
ation of information about compulsory risks. The Board encourages
hat not only the information that is required by law is revealed, but
t also must reach a high extent of informative content. Therefore,
he diversity in the members’ perspective derived from an increase
n the Board size would imply higher quality in corporate decisions
nd an increase in the quality of the information required by the
urrent regulation. These ﬁndings are in line with Pearce and Zhara
1992), Dalton et al. (1999) and Rodríguez Domínguez et al. (2011).
On the contrary, in the second model, our results show a nega-
ive relationship between Board size and the disclosure of voluntary
isks. Whereas the Board fosters a higher quality in the disclosure
f information that is indeed required (not restricted just to a strict
ompliance), it is more reluctant to reveal information which is not
equired beforehand. The disclosure of voluntary information about
isks is a complex decision, and it is difﬁcult that the Board agrees
n it, giving rise to doubts about the suitability of the decision. The
igher the Board, the higher the probability of internal dissensions,
s a consequence of the complexity of the decision; in this con-
ext, it is likely that the Board takes a prudent and conservative
osition regarding disclosure. On the other hand, the compulsory
isclosure is not called into question. These ﬁndings are in accor-
ance with previous empirical evidence, such as Eisenberg et al.
1998) and Andres et al. (2005), for whom an increase in the size of
he board may  decrease its effectiveness; this could lead to a lower
redisposition to disclose information.7LEVi + ˇ8SECi + t + ε.
The model explaining the disclosure of voluntary risks also
indicates a negative relationship between corporate size and the
disclosure. Given that we are dealing with large companies with
high visibility in the business context, an excessive revelation of
risks may  have negative repercussions that adversely affect mar-
ket valuations. They are more sensitive about their public image,
with a higher coverage by analysts. In this context, these ﬁrms are
reluctant to reveal information and are more prone to take a con-
servative policy as for disclosure, avoiding the inclusion of detailed
and voluntary divulgation of risks in their corporate reports.
Therefore, we detect that the reporting on risks is rather super-
ﬁcial, without providing a detailed description of the risks with
the strategic repercussions involved. This affects both the risks that
must be disclosed according to current regulations and especially
those that can be reported voluntarily as a part of the strategic dis-
closure of corporate information. This scarce voluntary disclosure
may  make it difﬁcult to evaluate the companies’ internal situation.
Our ﬁndings also stress the complexity of the decision about vol-
untary disclosures on risks and the relevance of public visibility as
a deterrent in this revelation.
8. Conclusions
The need for a higher degree of disclosure of corporate infor-
mation about risks has emerged recently, as a consequence of a
corporate context of increasing complexity in business strategies,
operations and regulations. Nevertheless, the main regulations
focus almost exclusively on risks derived from the use of ﬁnan-
cial instruments (e.g. credit risks or currency risks), at the same
time that previous studies show a lack of divulgation of quantitative
information on risks in different countries.
Faced with this context, we have performed this study in order
to analyse the main risks, both compulsory (mainly ﬁnancial risks)
and voluntary (e.g. business risks), disclosed by the largest Spanish
companies, and to determine the inﬂuence of some factors linked to
corporate governance on risk disclosure, controlling for the impact
of other corporate variables. To undertake this study, we  selected
the Spanish companies listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange during
the years 2007, 2008 and 2009.
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In a ﬁrst step, the methodology employed was based on a disclo-
ure index. The analysis performed in this sample conﬁrms that, in
ccordance with the results in other countries, most of the largest
panish companies reveal mainly the basic features of their oblig-
tory risks, as well as their management policy; as for the methods
sed to measure them and their risk coverage, companies show
 more disperse behaviour; in contrast, the issues least revealed
ave to do with future risks. To summarize, most companies report
heir compulsory risks in a generic and vague way  and, to a lesser
xtent, provide more speciﬁc data, without supplying a sufﬁcient
olume of quantitative information. It is worth emphasizing that
ost companies report very little about the risks that may  be vol-
ntarily disclosed, with those companies that reveal non-ﬁnancial
isks and providing more information being in the minority.
Concerning the hypotheses tested, after developing models
ased on panel data methodologies, our results show a posi-
ive relationship between the compulsory divulgation of risks and
oard size. Hence, this study conﬁrms that an increase in the size
f the Board may  imply that the broad set of perspectives in their
embers provide corporate decisions with higher quality, thereby
nﬂuencing the corporate reporting. As for compulsory disclosure,
he Board is more prone to reveal not just the minimum require-
ents by law, but to provide a higher extent of information.
On the other hand, we evidence a negative relationship between
he Board size and the voluntary disclosure about risks, stressing
he complexity in this disclosure decision. Larger boards may  be
ore reluctant to disclose information that is not strictly required
y the current regulations, focusing on the negative consequences
f this reporting.
Our ﬁndings also show a negative and signiﬁcant link between
orporate size and the voluntary reporting on risks. Given that
arge companies are especially visible, an excessive disclosure may
ave negative repercussions in strategic terms and may  adversely
ffect companies’ valuations. In this context, these companies tend
o adopt a prudent and conservative position, avoiding a detailed
isclosure.
Finally, we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant relationship between the
roportion of external directors, the Board activity, Board stock
wnership, proﬁtability, leverage and sector, on one hand, and
he disclosure of risks, on the other. The variable sector, which
s relevant in many disclosure studies, does not exhibit a signiﬁ-
ant impact on risk disclosure. Although the lack of signiﬁcance is
lso found in other works (e.g. Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Craven
 Marston, 1999; Giner et al., 2003; Giner, 1997; Larrán & Giner,
002), the risks borne by some sectors are widely believed to lead to
 higher degree of disclosure; therefore, the analysis of its potential
ffect should be extended in future research, by studying speciﬁc
ector.
The results obtained stress the lack of disclosure; moreover,
ost disclosure is focused on ﬁnancial risks, with a low degree
f revelation, mainly based on generic information. Spanish ﬁrms
omply with the disclosure of risks required by the norms and
egulation, but at a lower level without going into detail about
isks. Furthermore, the voluntary reporting on risks is rather scarce.
onsequently, the disclosure of this type of information should
e encouraged, given that most empirical studies have found that
ncluding risk measures in a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial statements improves
he quality of ﬁnancial information and reduces investor uncer-
ainty.
Likewise, it is necessary to analyse the reasons behind this
bsence of information, which may  stem from the following:
1) companies are not sufﬁciently aware of the importance of a
igher degree of disclosure; (2) there are not enough incentives
or disclosure; (3) systems of risk management are not sufﬁciently
eveloped or implemented; or (4) disclosure costs are specially
igh.lidad – Spanish Accounting Review 17 (2) (2014) 116–129 127
Owing to the scarce information voluntarily provided by compa-
nies, the role played by standard setters as agents that encourage
the disclosure of information about risks is more important than
ever, as this will improve the current system of accounting infor-
mation in order to make it useful to investors, stockholders and
debtholders in their analyses and decision-taking processes. Con-
sequently, accounting bodies should adopt a pro-active attitude,
requiring companies to disclose risks in an understandable and
detailed way that covers the current need for additional infor-
mation. Therefore, renewed and concerted efforts are needed to
encourage companies to provide information about the key risk
factors in their business models.
This study contains some limitations. Firstly, the methodology
used has meant additional limitations, given that the implementa-
tion of a disclosure index involves some subjective work regarding
the selection and weighting of the items (Bravo Urquiza et al., 2009;
García-Meca & Martínez, 2004; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Marston &
Shrives, 1991), as well as some potential problems related to the
design of the disclosure index.
Likewise, in future research a longer time period could be
approached. Also, the analysis can be extended to other contexts of
corporate governance, different from those analysed in the current
study, in different geographic areas across Europe; therefore, it
would be worth performing this analysis from a multinational
perspective. An interesting topic deriving from this research would
be to study in depth the relationship between risk disclosures
and capital costs, to learn of managers’ perspectives as to their
incentive to disclose and to analyse the strategies implemented by
investors to cope with risk disclosures. Also, the economic effects
derived from the disclosure of this type of information may  be
analysed in future studies.
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